



Differenced Risk Determinants in Portfolio at Risk of the Microfinance Institutions in México (2007-2012)



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


Abstract:

We analyze the way in which the credit risk faced by the Micro Finance Institutions (MFI's) is affected by risk factors as their size, margins, costs, and financial strength. We also analyze the differenced effects of those risk factors on the MFI's credit risk along the time and between MFI's by using two quantile panel regression methodologies. We found that the use of the normality assumption on the traditional panel analysis biases the results when the analyzed variables are not normal by diluting the .75 percentile sample characteristics (the most heterogeneous part of the sample) when the averages necessary for the traditional panel are made.



**Figure 1.1 Number of IMF`s and their portfolio in Mexico 1997-2012 Annual frequency.
Source: Own elaboration with data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MFI)**





MFI is given by two main indicators: operation self sufficiency, *oss*, and the financial self sufficiency, *fss*. These measures are given by

$$oss = \frac{or}{fe + l - lpe + oe}$$

$$fss = \frac{aor}{fe + l + lpe + oe + ea},$$

where:

***or:* Operating revenue,
fe: Financial expense,
l: Loans,
ea: Expense adjustments,**

***lpe:* Loss provision expense,
oe: Operating expense,
aor: Adjusted operating revenue,**



Table I Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Model.

| | $\Delta\%par_{30}$ | $\Delta\%glp$ | $\Delta\%ife$ | $\Delta\%ifi$ | $\Delta\%par90$ | $\Delta\%rc$ | $\Delta\%wor$ | $\Delta\%ygpn$ | $\Delta\%ygpr$ |
|-----------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| Skewnes | 4.346 | 3.567 | 2.6840 | 2.698 | 7.5197 | 3.468 | 7.276 | 0.264 | 0.166 |
| Kurtosis | 27.709 | 21.599 | 13.133 | 13.573 | 62.6750 | 16.635 | 59.238 | 3.803 | 3.605 |
| J-B | 42.884 | 1289.71 | 427.361 | 457.09 | 12308.68 | 760.63 | 10967 | 3.000 | 1.551 |
| | | 1 | 1 | 2 | | 5 | | | |
| Prob. | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.223 | 0.460 |

Source: Own computation with information of Microfinance Information Exchange MIX



$$\Delta y_{i,t} = f(\Delta y_{i,t-L})$$

$$y_{i,t} = f(\Delta y_{i,t-L})$$

$$\Delta y_{i,t} = \sum_{L=1}^{p_i} \theta_{iL} \Delta y_{i,t-1} + \rho y_{i,t-1} + \alpha_{mi} d_{mt} + \varepsilon_{it}$$



Table II Breitung & Mayer Unit Root Test

| | par30 | glp | Ife | Ifi | par90 | rc | wor | ygpn | Ygpr |
|------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Statistic | -1.923 | -1.355 | -1.158 | -2.602 | -3.243 | -2.492 | -1.861 | -4.288 | -3.385 |
| Prob | 0.027 | 0.088 | 0.123 | 0.005 | 0.000 | 0.006 | 0.031 | 0.000 | 0.000 |

Source: Own computation, with information of Microfinance Information Exchange MIX.



Table III Unit Root Levin Lin Chu Test

| | | $\Delta\%par30$ | $\Delta\%glp$ | $\Delta\%ife$ | $\Delta\%ifi$ | $\Delta\%par90$ | $\Delta\%rc$ | $\Delta\%wor$ | $\Delta\%ygpn$ | $\Delta\%ygpr$ |
|-----------|------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| Statistic | 1* | -13.261 | -11.315 | -10.12 | -7.726 | -11.281 | -89.77 | -42.497 | -9.744 | -9.215 |
| Prob | | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Statistic | 2** | -14.407 | -12.189 | -19.46 | -10.56 | -20.898 | -45.69 | -25.170 | -10.191 | -9.712 |
| Prob | | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Statistic | 3*** | -13.490 | -6.989 | -8.896 | -7.194 | -10.855 | -71.12 | -44.955 | -10.840 | -10.552 |
| Prob | | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |

1* none, 2** intercept, 3*** intercept and trend

Source: On computation with information of Microfinance Information Exchange MIX



Pooled, Fixed and Random Effects

$$\text{par30}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{glp}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{ife}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{ifi}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{par90}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{rc} + \beta_6 \text{wor} + \beta_7 \text{yngp} + \beta_8 \text{ygpr} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$\text{par30}_{it} = \beta_i + \beta_1 \text{glp}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{ife}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{ifi}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{par90}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{rc} + \beta_6 \text{wor} + \beta_7 \text{yngp} + \beta_8 \text{ygpr} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$\text{par30}_{it} = \beta_0 + u_i + \beta_1 \text{glp}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{ife}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{ifi}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{par90}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{rc} + \beta_6 \text{wor} + \beta_7 \text{yngp} + \beta_8 \text{ygpr} + \varepsilon_{it}$$



Table IV Results of Pooled Regression, Fixed Effects and Random Effects

| Coefficient | Pooled | Prob | FE | Prob | RE | Prob |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| glp | -1.3245 (0.431) | 0.003 | 1.7032 (0.450) | 0.000 | -1.3792 (0.428) | 0.001 |
| Ife | -1.8645 (0.267) | 0.000 | -1.9558 (0.273) | 0.000 | -1.8823 (0.264) | 0.000 |
| Ifi | 5.1378 (0.614) | 0.000 | 5.3481 (0.623) | 0.000 | 5.1746 (0.606) | 0.000 |
| par90 | 0.1327 (0.021) | 0.000 | 0.1109 (0.023) | 0.000 | 0.1293 (0.021) | 0.000 |
| Rc | -0.3169 (0.094) | 0.001 | -0.3361 (0.099) | 0.001 | -0.3187 (0.093) | 0.001 |
| Wor | 0.0297 (0.009) | 0.003 | 0.0232 (0.010) | 0.025 | 0.0288 (0.009) | 0.002 |
| Ygpn | 12.7623 (5.092) | 0.015 | 13.6829 (5.032) | 0.009 | 12.8923 (5.008) | 0.010 |
| Ygpr | -15.4966 (4.530) | 0.001 | -16.2747 (4.476) | 0.001 | -15.6044 (4.454) | 0.000 |
| Cons | -0.0205 (0.132) | 0.877 | 0.1287 (0.142) | 0.368 | 0.0007 (0.139) | 0.996 |

Source: Own elaboration whit data from de MIX



Table V Hausman and Breusch - Pagan test for the models in table IV

| Test | Statistic | Probability |
|----------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Hausman | 90.41 | 0.0000 |
| BP-LM | 0.01 | 0.453 |

Source: Own computation with information of the MIX



$$\hat{q}_\tau = \underset{q \in \mathbb{R}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \left[(\tau - 1) \sum_{y_i < q} (y_i - q) + \tau \sum_{y_i \geq q} (y_i - q) \right]$$

$$\beta_\tau = \underset{\beta \in \mathbb{R}^k}{\operatorname{argmin}} E(\rho_\tau(Y - X\beta))$$



Sample Moment 1

$$g_i(\mathbf{b}) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T D_{it} \left[(Y_{it} \leq D'_{it}\mathbf{b}) - \frac{1}{T} (Y_{is} \leq D'_{is}\mathbf{b}) \right]$$

Sample Moment 2

$$h(\mathbf{b}) = \frac{1}{NT} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{1}(Y_{it} \leq D'_{it}\mathbf{b}) - \tau$$



Table VI Quantile Regression in Panel Data

| Coefficient | 0.25 | Prob | 0.5 | Prob | 0.75 | prob | Pooled | Prob |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------|--------------|
| Glp | -0.6488 (0.1921) | 0.001 | -0.8985 (0.3559) | 0.014 | -0.9923 (0.8653) | 0.255 | -1.3245 (0.4312) | 0.003 |
| ife | -0.5518 (0.1102) | 0.000 | -0.9627 (0.2281) | 0.000 | -1.4148 (0.4887) | 0.005 | -1.8645 (0.2671) | 0.000 |
| ifi | 1.3488 (0.2551) | 0.000 | 2.4275 (0.5117) | 0.000 | 4.2504 (1.3381) | 0.002 | 5.1378 (0.6138) | 0.000 |
| par90 | 0.1053 (0.0046) | 0.000 | 0.1066 (0.0066) | 0.000 | 0.2306 (0.0238) | 0.000 | 0.1327 (0.0214) | 0.000 |
| rc | -0.2981 (0.0481) | 0.000 | -0.2543 (0.0640) | 0.000 | -0.2290 (0.1315) | 0.086 | -0.3170 (0.0938) | 0.001 |
| wor | 0.0092 (0.0030) | 0.003 | 0.0135 (0.0060) | 0.027 | 0.0195 (0.0134) | 0.151 | 0.0296 (0.0095) | 0.003 |
| ygpn | 8.6643 (2.7550) | 0.002 | 15.0184 (4.2734) | 0.001 | 13.0840 (7.5611) | 0.088 | 12.7623 (5.0923) | 0.015 |
| ygpr | -8.0241 (2.5608) | 0.003 | -15.0715 (3.7973) | 0.000 | -14.8392 (6.1519) | 0.019 | -15.4966 (4.5296) | 0.001 |
| Cons | -0.0304 (0.0706) | 0.669 | 0.2328 (0.1114) | 0.040 | 0.2783 (0.2292) | 0.229 | -0.0205 (0.1322) | 0.877 |

Source: Own computation with information of Microfinance Information Exchange MIX



Table VII Quantile Fixed Effect, Regression in Panel Data with Non-Additive Error Term Portfolio at Risk (par30) in function of the change in the gross loan portfolio (glp) and time

| Coefficient | 0.25 | Prob | 0.5 | Prob | 0.75 | Prob | Pooled | Prob |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Glp | -2.9 | 0.7817 | 4.3 | 0.2177 | 1.4 | 0.4739 | 1.3476 | 0.000 |
| | (3.7279) | | (5.5148) | | (21.443) | | (0.3294) | |
| α_{2007} | 0.7086 | | -2.3541 | | -0.0046 | | | |
| α_{2008} | 0.2506 | | -0.1288 | | 0.9215 | | | |
| α_{2009} | 0.9094 | | -1.3976 | | -0.0918 | | | |
| α_{2010} | 0.7126 | | -1.7179 | | -0.2843 | | | |
| α_{2011} | 0.0867 | | -0.0522 | | 0.9055 | | | |
| α_{2012} | 0.6183 | | -1.2904 | | -0.2505 | | | |

Source: Own computation with information of Microfinance Information Exchange MIX



**Table VIII Quantile Fixed Effect, Regression in Panel Data with Non-Additive Error Term
Portfolio at Risk (par30) in function percent variation of portfolio at risk 90 (par90) and time**

| Coefficient | 0.25 | Prob | 0.5 | Prob | 0.75 | Prob | Pooled | Prob |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|
| par90 | 0.3 | 0.1614 | 0.90 | 0.0129 | 3.5 | 0.0001 | 0.1473 | 0.000 |
| | (0.3035) | | (0.4042) | | (0.9551) | | (0.0357) | |
| α_{2007} | -0.4092 | | -0.0147 | | 1.6192 | | | |
| α_{2008} | -0.2113 | | -0.1676 | | 0.3484 | | | |
| α_{2009} | -0.1439 | | -0.2059 | | -0.5050 | | | |
| α_{2010} | -0.3300 | | -0.0145 | | 1.0647 | | | |
| α_{2011} | -0.0323 | | 0.0885 | | 0.1822 | | | |
| α_{2012} | -0.1535 | | 0.0966 | | 1.2372 | | | |

Source: Own computation with information of Microfinance Information Exchange MIX



**Table IX Quantile Fixed Effect, Regression in Panel Data with Non-Additive Error Term
Portfolio at Risk (par30) in function of interest and fee income (ifi) and time**

| Coefficient | 0.25 | Prob | 0.5 | Prob | 0.75 | Prob | Pooled | Prob |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|
| Ifi | -5 | 0.3955 | 5 | 0.0257 | -5 | 0.0007 | -0.002 | 0.768 |
| | (0.000) | | (0.000) | | (0.000) | | (0.008) | |
| α_{2007} | 75.43 | | -0.4771 | | 260.59 | | | |
| α_{2008} | 80.01 | | 0.0805 | | 260.19 | | | |
| α_{2009} | 85.81 | | 0.1068 | | 265.37 | | | |
| α_{2010} | 90.94 | | -0.6970 | | 269.63 | | | |
| α_{2011} | 97.39 | | -0.0908 | | 276.69 | | | |
| α_{2012} | 99.86 | | 0.2004 | | 280.24 | | | |

Source: Own computation with information of Microfinance Information Exchange MIX



Conclusions

As we content at the beginning of the paper, the Micro Finance industry became competed along the time of the sample, especially on the crisis years, but this competition affected in different ways to the firms on the industry. Our quantile regressions showed that the bigger (and most exposed) companies don't take into account; for their credit risk managemet; variables as the change on the gross loan portfolio, *glp*, the change on the risk coverage, *rc*, the change of the write off ratio, *wor*, or the yield on nominal gross portfolio, *ypgn*.



We found that there is a differentiated behavior of the firms depending on their risk exposure. This is also noted because the significant parameters differ, sometimes substantially, between quartiles and along the time. This means that the subprime crisis affected in a different way each quartile on the sample and that the quality of the borrower changes over the time.



We also give some empirical evidence on the way in which the normality assumption affects the panel regression results. Under the normality assumption, the pooled model was the best, implying that all the MFI's behaves in the same way and that this behavior is constant along the time. But when we introduced the quantile regression, we gave empirical evidence of differenced responses, along the time and between quartiles, to changes in some credit risk factors. Also, we found that the .75 percentile of the IMF's sample is the source of a big part of heterogeneity, because is in that quartile where most of the regressors became statistically non significant.



| MFI's analyzed on the paper | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ALSOL | Compartamos Banco | Forjadores de Negocios |
| APROS | Conserva | Pro Mujer - MEX |
| CAME | FINCA – MEX | SemiSol |
| COCDEP | FinComun | SOLFI |
| Vision Fund - MEX | | |



¡Muchas Gracias!